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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
This appeal is for the purpose of requiring the Labor Commission to allow the 
receipt of clarifying facts and evidence that Carradine was not gainfully employed after 
his injury in 1988 and after the prior final adjudication in 1992, as he did not have the 
ability to testify of the same at the hearing. The Utah Labor Commission has ongoing 
jurisdiction over all claims of permanent total disability even if they have already been 
adjudicated. In Color Country Management v. Labor Com'n, 38 P.3d 969, 974-75 (Utah 
App. 2001), the Utah Court of Appeals stated that u[w]orkers' compensation claims are 
best viewed as a process, rather than as a discrete event, and the Commission ha[s] 
continuing jurisdiction over... claims. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-420(l)(a) (2009) 
(stating that "[t]he powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be 
continuing." Under the circumstances, where ERF and WCF each separately sought to 
amend the Labor Commission's findings of fact and conclusions of law, after the hearing, 
and it was allowed, it is unfair to deny Petitioner the right to also amend the Labor 
Commission's ruling or to re-open the hearing for the purpose of taking evidence. 
Particularly where it is the Labor Commission's duty and the Court of Appeals' 
requirement to "resolve '[a]ny doubt respecting the right of compensation in favor of the 
injured employee.' "Ae Clevite, Inc. v. Labor Com'n, 996 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah Ct. 
App.,2000), citing Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1997). It is the 
court's "long-standing policy that the Workers' Compensation Act should be liberally 
construed to effectuate its purposes." Utah Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Manning, 985 P.2d 
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243, 249 (Utah, 1999) citing Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P.2d 994, 
995 (1972). The overall philosophy governing the interpretation of Utah's workers' 
compensation statutes is one of liberal construction. See, e.g., Carlucci v. Industrial 
Commfn, 725 P.2d at 1338. And the legislature has directed that workers' compensation 
proceedings are not to be burdened with technicalities but are to be conducted so as to 
protect the substantial rights of the parties within the spirit of the workers' compensation 
statutes. Gardner v. Edward Gardner Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 693 P.2d 678, 681 (Utah 
1984). 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
Appellee argues, in short, that the Labor Commission properly declined to accept 
evidence of Carradine's last date of gainful employment because 1) the proffered 
evidence was not "new," and 2) the evidence was not timely. Appellee further argues 
that the Labor Commission's finding was supported by substantial evidence. As shown 
herein, Appellee's arguments fall short and the Labor Commission should have allowed 
in evidence regarding when Carradine's employment was not intermittent or casual. 
I. The Labor Commission's Refusal to accept evidence or re-open the hearing 
regarding the time period of Petitioner's gainful employment was error. 
A. Appellee's Definition of New Evidence Does Not Apply. 
In United Airlines Transport Corp., v Industrial Commission, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that "[t]he Industrial Commission should not reopen a case merely for the 
purpose of hearing cumulative or corroborative evidence; but when new evidence is 
available.. .then their power to reconsider the case is not curtailed" 175 P.2d 752 (Utah, 
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1946). (emphasis added). Submitting evidence of Carradine's gainful employment after 
the injury and after the prior adjudication in 1992, should not be excluded under United 
Airlines. In United Airlines there was an evidentiary issue regarding introduction of 
certain "California laws:" 
The evidence as to the California laws was not introduced at the first hearing 
before the Commission. At the second hearing that evidence was supplied by 
stipulation. This is not a case of merely submitting cumulative or corroborative 
evidence. It is one of supplying that which was omitted at the first hearing. 
Id., at 754. The evidence of the California laws was not "new" in that there was no 
discussion as to a new, retroactive law coming into play. Instead, it appears that the 
California laws were previously existing or known but simply "omitted" in the first 
hearing. Similarly, evidence of Carradine's intermittent employment activities between 
his original 1988 injury, the prior final adjudication in 1992, and his last date of any 
employment in 2000, were omitted from the hearing -although they were received later 
by way of two medical reports. 
Appellee asserts that Carradine's evidence is not "new evidence" Appellee claims 
that "new evidence is generally characterized as evidence that is newly discovered and 
could not have been discovered previously by the exercise of due diligence." Appellee's 
Brief, p. 12, citing PromaxDev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), 
and U.P.C. Inc., v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 990 P.2d 945 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Appellee's 
cited cases come from district court and do not apply to the present matter because, 
unlike the district court, the Labor Commission's procedures and definition of "new 
evidence" as used in the workers compensation setting, and as highlighted in United 
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Airlines, is more liberal than the district court. "[Continuing jurisdiction is not limited 
to consideration of changes in physical condition of workmen, but is extended to the right 
to rescind, alter, or amend orders, decisions, or awards on good cause appearing 
therefore/' Frito-Lay v. Labor Com n, 222 P.3d 55, 62 (Utah, 2009). Good cause exists 
here. Labor Commission administrative rules use the term "good cause" but do not 
define it. Dealing with successive writs of habeas corpus, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
"held that successive petitions should be permitted 'if for some justifiable reason [the 
petitioner] was previously unable to assert the rights or was unaware of the significance 
of relevant facts...." Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1037(Utah, 1989), citing Price v. 
Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 291 (1948). The Labor Commission is not bound by the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, but instead "may receive as evidence and use as proof of any fact in 
dispute all evidence deemed material and relevant." § 34A-2-802, Utah Code Ann. 
While Mr. Carradine could have given his testimony regarding his last gainful 
employment himself, he became unavailable when he had a seizure during the course of 
the hearing. Justice would best be served by allowing the use of Carradine's own 
statements to establish his last date of gainful employment because the purpose of 
workers compensation is "to provide relief to the victims of industrial accidents..." 
Burgess v. Siaperas Sand & Gravel, 965 P.2d 583, 585 (Utah Ct. App.,1998). 
B. Evidence of Carradine's Last Employment Was Timely. 
"The power of the Industrial Commission [predecessor of the Labor Commission] 
to modify awards when "in its opinion" modification is justified is not an arbitrary power, 
Mecham v. Industrial Commission, 692 P.2d 783 (Utah 1984); Buxton v. Industrial 
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Commission, 587 P.2d 121 (Utah 1978), but a power wedded to the duty to examine 
credible evidence/' Spencer v. Indus. Commn of Utah, 733 P.2d 158, 160 (Utah, 1987). 
It is established law that '"workers1 compensation proceedings were "not to be burdened 
with technicalities" but were "to be conducted ... to protect the substantial rights of the 
parties." Frito-Lay v. Labor Com % 11 P.3d 55 (Utah, 2009), citing Thomas A. Paulsen, 
Co. v. Industrial Com % 11Q P.2d 125, 130 (Utah 1989). The preceding authorities 
should toss out any notion that the Labor Commission must take a procedural hard line 
on evidence. Recent cases continue to support Commission's discretion to accept, and its 
decision to accepted late filed evidence. See Resort Retainers v. Labor Com % 238 P.3d 
1081 (Utah Ct. App., 2010). The rule of United Airlines, shows that it is not even too 
late to present evidence that was "omitted" from the hearing. 175 P.2d, at 754. 
The Labor Commission's own administrative rules require the ALJ to reopen the 
hearing after a motion for review. When a motion for review is filed the: 
Administrative Law Judge shall: 
a. Reopen the case and enter a Supplemental Order after holding such further 
hearing and receiving such further evidence as may be deemed necessary; 
b. Amend or modify the prior Order by a Supplemental Order; or 
c. Refer the entire case for review under Section 34A-2-801, Utah Code. 
R602-2-1 (M) (1) (a) Utah Admin. Code (emphasis added). Clearly the ALJ was able, 
under the rules, to formally hold a "further hearing" to receive the "further evidence" of 
Carradine's last gainful employment -but refused to do so in violation of the Rule. 
Furthermore, the ALJ's and Labor Commission's refusal to do so does not meet the 
"reasonable and rational" standard: 
To determine if the Appeals Board's decision is reasonable and rational, we apply 
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the substantial evidence test, which requires us to examine 'all of the evidence 
supporting the Board's findings and [determine whether,] despite the supporting 
facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, the findings are 
not supported by substantial evidence given the record as a whole. 
Petro Hunt, LLC v. Dept. Workforce Svcs, 197 P.3d 107, 114 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). "All 
of the evidence" supporting the Labor Commission's findings consist of a single 
statement by Carradine's counsel a few moments after Carradine had suffered a seizure. 
The date was a bit different than the date identified in original pleadings as being the last 
date of employment. However, the Commission did not take evidence on whether such 
employment was gainful or intermittent or casual. Carradine contended in his Motion for 
Review and supporting affidavits that said employment was not gainful. Because the key 
issue in this matter is when Petitioner's "period of disability" began, the ALT should have 
reopened the hearing, as required by the Rule, to take such limited evidence regarding the 
actual dates of gainful employment (as opposed to intermittent or casual) because such 
doubts should be resolved in favor of the injured employee. 
II. The Labor Commission's Determination is not supported by Substantial 
Evidence. 
To successfully challenge an agency's factual findings, a party must marshall 
evidence. "This requires counsel to construct the evidence supporting the adversary's 
position, and then "ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." Id, citing West Valley City v. 
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct.App.1991). The adversary's position, 
and the ruling of the ALJ was that Mr. Carradine was last able to work in July 2000. All 
of the evidence relied on by the ALJ in establishing Mr. Carradine's last date of gainful 
employment was cited in the July 27,2009, Order, and it consisted of Carradine's 
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original applications, and a statement of Carradine's counsel made at the hearing 
moments after Carradine suffered a seizure. See record pages 00181-00182. The ALJ 
did not rely on any other evidence to set the last date of gainful employment. 
The "fatal flaw" in the evidence is that after the hearing there were two very 
probative statements put into the record of evidence regarding Mr. Carradine's last date 
of gainful employment that were entirely ignored by the ALJ. The Medical Panel 
reported that Mr. Carradine uhas not worked since the 09-02-88 injury." See record page 
00100. Dr. Goldman states further: "it is significant to note that as early as 1990, he was 
no longer taking care of his own financial needs." Id. p. 6. This information would have 
come to Dr. Goldman from Mr. Carradine himself. Mr. Carradine's own 
Neuropsychological Evaluation provides "Mr. Carradine stated that he has been unable to 
work since 1991." See record page 44. Neither of these reports were available at the 
April 26, 2006, hearing but were provided after the hearing and the ALJ quoted from and 
relied on both the Medical Panel Report and the Neuropsychological Evaluation in 
making her findings of fact and conclusions of law. There were no objections made to 
the Medical Panel Report or to the written Neuropsychological Evaluation from either the 
WCFortheERF. 
The only hearing in this matter occurred on April 26, 2006, in which Mr. 
Carradine was unable to testify due to his seizure. There was no other opportunity to 
submit testimonial evidence due to the ALJ's requirement in her letter dated October 12, 
2007: "the upcoming hearing is not to repeat the prior hearing and present the same 
witnesses and evidence (or to introduce evidence which was available at the time of the 
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prior hearing, but not presented." (Record page 00076). By not allowing testimony at 
the later hearing, or in later proceedings, the ALJ did not "obtain full disclosure of 
relevant facts" or "afford [Mr. Carradine] reasonable opportunity to present [his] 
position." Id. Furthermore, the ALJ accepted as evidence the written Neuropsychological 
Examination report that was produced after the hearing. And, the ALJ accepted as 
evidence the Medical Panel's report that was produced after the hearing. Both reports 
provide a more accurate date of Petitioner's last date of gainful employment. 
The ALJ's statement "The Petitioner last worked sometime in July 2000 and a 
more precise date was not put into evidence" is inaccurate as both of the reports were put 
into evidence. In spite of the probative evidence from the medical panel and medical 
provider, the ALJ continued to rely solely on the statement given by counsel. The ALJ 
cited a statement of Mr. Carradine's counsel at the hearing that "The last day of work 
would be 2001 and I'm [inaudible] date. [Long pause] According to [inaudible] the last 
date of work was July 2000." See Record pages 00180-00184. Of the three dates given, 
the most reliable are the dates given by Mr. Carradine himself to medical providers. 
Appellee attempts to discredit the information calling it either "hearsay" or 
claiming that acceptance of the dates would result in the ALJ abdicating its fact finding 
responsibility to the medical panel. See Appellee Brief, p. 22, citing Speirs v. S. Utah 
Univ., 60 P.3d 42,44 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). Appellee's claims don't hold water because 
the Labor Commission is not bound by the Utah Rules of Evidence, but instead is 
allowed to "receive as evidence and use as proof of any fact in dispute all evidence 
deemed material and relevant." § 34A-2-802, Utah Code Ann. Furthermore, the reports 
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of the medical panel were incorporated into the record and accepted without objection. 
The statements regarding his last gainful employment are evidence of a material fact at 
issue in a hearing to determine permanent total disability. The statements of Mr. 
Carradine regarding his last gainful employment are more probative than any other 
evidence, including the statement by counsel which simply stated the last date of any 
employment -no discussion was had of intermittent, casual, or gainful employment. 
The substantial evidence favors Mr. Carradine and allows relief in this 
circumstance where 'the agency action is based on a determination of fact... that is not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the 
court." Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church Of Jesus Christ Of Latter-Day Saints, 
164 P.3d 384 (Utah,2007), citing § 63-46b-16(4)(g). Because the ALTs finding of fact is 
not supported by the substantial evidence in the overall record, it must be set aside. Peck 
v. Eimco Process Equipment Co., 748 P.2d 572 (Utah 1987). 
The Labor Commission's alleged reliance on § 63-46b-8, contradicts its duty to 
examine credible evidence. Any procedural requirements must take a back seat to the 
overall purpose of the Workers Compensation Act. 'The [Workers Compensation] Act is 
a humanitarian and economical system designed to provide relief to the victims of 
industrial accidents..." fcTo give effect to that purpose, the Act should be liberally 
construed and applied to provide coverage. Any doubt respecting the right of 
compensation will be resolved in favor of the injured employee." State Tax Common v. 
Industrial Comm% 685 P.2d 1051,1053 (Utah 1984). 
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CONCLUSION 
To paraphrase Appellee's argument, Appellee seeks to impose a hard line in 
limiting all evidence and legal argument to what was submitted at the workers 
compensation hearing where Carradine suffered a seizure. Appellee relies on case law 
outside of the workers compensation realm, that is not based on the Labor Commission's 
continuing jurisdiction and its actual duty "as to its continuing jurisdiction [that] is not 
limited to consideration of changes in physical condition of workmen, but is extended to 
the right to rescind, alter, or amend orders, decisions, or awards on good cause appearing 
therefor." Frito-Lay v. Utah Labor Com % 222 P.3d 55, 62 (Utah, 2009). Petitioner asks 
the Court to order the Labor Commission to allow Petitioner to submit evidence, that 
would tend to prove that he was not gainfully employed after his injury in September of 
1988, the 1992 prior adjudication, and that the intermittent employment he had between 
those periods and 2000 was not gainful employment such that his award of permanent 
total disability should begin from the date of the original injury. Alternatively, Petitioner 
asks the Court to find, based on the facts in the record, that his last date of gainful 
employment was in 1988, and order the Labor Commission to revise its findings 
accordingly. 
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